There is night and day between an entity such as WikiLeaks, a daring publisher of classified government documents extraordinaire, and the dour, secretive intelligence service of any country. But it seems that, just as the owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk, some of them are learning a few lessons. For one thing, the British foreign intelligence service, M16, has decided to take to the World Wide Web, especially its dark version, to lure recruits and secrets. How close, then, to the practices of Julian Assange and the publishing organisation that made him infamous and the subject of much abomination in intelligence circles.
The intended platform is to have the name Silent Courier. “As the world changes and threats multiply, we must stay ahead of our adversaries,” stated Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper. “Our intelligence agencies work tirelessly to keep British people safe, and this cutting-edge technology will help M16 recruit new agents, including in Russia and beyond.” Given the extensive historical record of deep penetration of the British intelligence services by Russians, this is bound to have induced a bored yawn.
The official announcement came from Sir Richard Moore, the outgoing M16 chief who decided to use Istanbul as the place to make it. “Today, we’re asking those with sensitive information on global instability, international terrorism, or hostile state activity to contact MI6 securely online.” With paternal assurance, he promised that, “Our virtual door is open to you.”
The recruitment approach is not dissimilar to the campaigns used by the US Central Intelligence Agency. In 2022 and 2023, the organisation employed such platforms as Telegram, Facebook, X (previously X) and Instagram to net potential recruits from Russia. Instructions were also released on how to contact the agency on the dark web. The CIA, being convinced of the efficacy of these moves, released a video last year on Telegram titled “Why I contacted the CIA: the motherland” urging Russians to target Russia’s real enemies: the country’s leadership. “Our leaders sell out the country,” moralises the fictional officer of Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, “for palaces and yachts while our soldiers chew rotten potatoes and fire ancient weapons.”
 An uncharitable reading of such moves suggest that the US spy outfit, being incapable of building human networks with human agents in Russia, requires the services of social media to secure contacts. While we are not sure about the extent of how successful these moves have been, the standard of efficacy, if we are to believe a CIA spokesperson, is taken to be the number of viewings of the various posts. Troubling, if true.
This month, a partnership with Google Cloud between the UK and US was minted, an agreement that again shows the insatiable appetite on the part of governments to secure the services of Big Tech. “The partnership,” states the September 12 press release from the Ministry of Defence, “means that the latest technology developed by Google Cloud, including AI, data analytics, and cyber security, will be used by defence intelligence and national security specialists to share secure information between our partners and outcompete our adversaries.”
These agencies, it would seem, have been seduced by the very world hated by government bureaucrats and the secrecy mongers: the use of the dark web, the incitement to steal information, and using an encrypted platform that echoes the WikiLeaks model for securing information from leakers and whistleblowers. Â
For some, the world of clandestine meetings and the exchange of envelopes has become a bit fusty and mothballed, though there is something more profound about those personal ties in the recruitment process. The use of technology, however, has become irresistible, even a fetish, and agencies have come to realise that secure platforms enabling foreign agents or those in foreign employ to communicate classified material is a worthwhile endeavour.
The MI6 platform makes use of the Tor network, a facility that, while strong, is not impervious. The agency advises that potential contacts resort to VPNs to access the platform, supplying a dedicated email address for communications. Also encouraged is the use of private browsing with devices equipped with updated security and eschewing the use of credit cards.
The dark web, while attractive, is not an impenetrable jungle. The resourceful and persistent will find a way. Beijing’s Ministry of State Security has, for instance, previously succeeded in penetrating encrypted CIA platforms with spectacular success. Between 2010 and 2012, according to the New York Times, some 20 CIA informants were either killed or imprisoned by the Chinese authorities. The theories offered are conventional: traditional, old-school exposure of the sources by virtue of a well-placed mole within the American agency, or the ability of the country’s cyber platoons to break the channels of secure communication. And never, of course, rule out simple negligence.
M16, in going WikiLeaks, has acknowledged, at the very least, the value of having avenues of disclosure that do cast light on rough, inscrutable terrain drawn from sources of value. The legacy of WikiLeaks speaks to exposing the secretive information that should be known to the public, exposing those venal types in power to withering scrutiny. MI6 intends to perform the same function, with one crucial difference: those secrets will be intended for minimal circulation among the anointed elite in order to advance the agenda of His Majesty’s Government. That, at least, is the intention.Â
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. Email: bkampmark@gmail.comÂ
