Decades beyond recall, Africa has choicelessly become the unfortunate landlord of wars whose tenants are often Europeans. First came the French war on terror, then the Russian security bargain, and now the long shadow of Ukraine has begun stretching across the Sahara. The Sahel, which already has enough ghosts to fill a desert, is being invited to accommodate another. This is the strange tragedy of our age: a war born in the forests and cities of Eastern Europe is acquiring African echoes, while Africans are expected to applaud whichever foreign power happens to arrive bearing the language of sovereignty. I am not persuaded. When Mali’s northern battlefield became entangled with the Russia-Ukraine quarrel after Ukrainian intelligence officials made remarks interpreted as acknowledging that Tuareg rebels had received information useful for their attack on Malian and Russian forces, Bamako broke relations with Kyiv, and Niger followed. Ukraine denied supporting terrorism or the rebels. Even while the quarrel might seem to have ended there like many diplomatic quarrels do with cold handshakes, but the Sahel has never been that region where sparks get ectonguinshed with ease. They travel. They hide beneath the sand. They wait for wind.
The first danger is that Africa is being converted into a proxy theatre. That word, proxy, sounds innocent enough, almost like something found in an office drawer. It is not. A proxy war means that powerful men can fight without necessarily burying their own children beneath the soil on which the fighting occurs. Mali already has the Russian Africa Corps operating beside its forces, while armed groups have continued to challenge Bamako across the north and beyond. The recent account of Mali’s widening conflict is one increasingly marked by simultaneous assaults, ambushes and drone warfare. And troubling to ask, is, what then happens when Kyiv sees Russian personnel in Mali not merely as foreign soldiers but as an extension of the Kremlin, while Moscow also sees Ukrainian contact with the anti-government forces as another front in its war with the West? Howbeit, with this, the Malian farmers do not become Russians and the Tuaregs do not become Ukrainians, but the geography around them can become Russian-Ukrainian by association – if care is not taken. And that is how sovereignty is quietly hollowed out. The flag remains African while the strategic imagination becomes foreign.
In all of these, there is the more uncomfortable question of armed rebellions. Northern Mali has not suddenly become unstable because Kyiv appeared at the door. Its troubles are much older. And some of them are the Tuareg question, the collapse of the Libyan order, the FLA instability, the weak state institutions and the failure of successive political settlements, which have all fed the furnace. The Algiers peace agreement was in its commendable sense an attempt to place political negotiation between Bamako and northern armed groups before the sword. Sadly, its collapse has left a vacuum into which guns, grievances, and foreign calculations have marched. The recent cooperation between the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front and JNIM, an al-Qaeda affiliate whose ideological objectives are radically different from Tuareg nationalism, shows what happens when enemies discover that they share an enemy. “Al Jazeera’s report on the new armed-group alignment in Mali” tells the story with chilling clarity. Why should Africa celebrate the internationalisation of such a conflict? Yesterday’s rebel can become today’s intelligence partner; today’s partner can become tomorrow’s liability. Foreign assistance to a local armed actor may win a battle and lose the possibility of peace.
The second danger is quite technological, as Ukraine has now become one of the world’s most experienced laboratories for drone warfare, which it has even demonstrated in his ongoing war against Russia. Sadly, Ukraine drones are increasingly risky in Africa and in her conflicts. The Sahel does not need another innovation race in which an inexpensive flying machine gives a disgruntled faction the destructive reach once reserved for states. In a recent assessment by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9,928 were reported as fatalities linked to militant groups in the Sahel over the latest twelve-month period, while also noting the very troubling growing use of remote violence and drones. I find the statistics so frightening, and this is not because it proves that Ukraine caused the violence, but because it clearly reveals the combustible ground upon which any new military technology is being introduced. The desert has always been difficult to govern. Now it is becoming easier to surveil, strike and destabilise from the sky. A camel once carried intelligence across the Sahara. Today a small machine can carry something far more sinister. That is progress only if one has forgotten what progress is supposed to serve.
And Russia will not watch this transformation from an armchair in Moscow. If Ukraine’s presence is interpreted as an attempt to weaken Russian influence in the Sahel, Moscow has every reason to deepen its own security relationships. The result could be an African security market where foreign powers compete for clients, access and influence while local governments bargain away pieces of strategic autonomy in exchange for immediate protection. We have seen this movie before, only the actors changed costumes. Colonial powers once arrived with maps and treaties; the Cold War arrived with ideology and rifles; the post-Cold War era arrived with aid, counterterrorism and consultants. Now security partnerships are returning with drones, intelligence and private military formations. The tragedy is not even that Africa has friends abroad, as every serious state needs friends. The tragedy begins when friendship becomes dependency and dependency becomes the price of survival. As author George Orwell wrote in Animal Farm: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” The Sahel must be careful not to become the animal whose equality exists chiefly in diplomatic speeches.
There is also a moral complication which cannot be wished away by geopolitical vocabulary. If foreign powers cultivate armed groups because those groups happen to be useful against another foreign power, the principle of African sovereignty becomes wonderfully elastic. It stretches for allies and contracts for enemies. Russia has been accused of abuses through forces operating alongside African governments, while Ukraine has faced accusations from Mali and Niger over alleged support for armed actors, allegations Kyiv rejects. The proper African response should not be to choose which allegation we find geopolitically convenient. It should be to insist upon one rule. No foreign power should be permitted to turn African armed conflicts into instruments of its external war. Otherwise, we become like the man who complains about the thief only because the thief entered through the neighbour’s window. What matters is that the house was entered. What matters even more is who is left to sleep among the broken furniture.
The consequences will not remain in the desert. The Sahel is not a sealed geographical box with a lid on it. Its insecurity has already pressed towards coastal West Africa, and Nigeria cannot afford to regard developments in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso as somebody else’s northern weather. The latest Africa Center assessment records 504 fatalities in 2026 linked to Sahelian militant groups in north-western Nigeria, after none were recorded in its dataset there in 2024. That is not an argument that Ukraine caused those deaths. It is an argument that the regional security ecosystem is changing, and that Nigeria sits inside it. What begins as an argument between Kyiv and Moscow can therefore become a problem for Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Niger or even Northern Nigeria and far beyond. The Sahara does not respect the punctuation marks of diplomatic communiques. Nor does terrorism consult the maps drawn by ministries of foreign affairs.
But the deepest danger is quite even intellectual: What if Africa begins to forget the difference between solving her own problems and becoming useful to people solving theirs. The Sahel needs unhealthy foreign interference, reasonable political settlements, an accountable government, economic opportunity, credible institutions, and security forces trusted by the communities they protect. It does not need to become the chessboard upon which Russia and Ukraine continue a European argument with African pieces. I therefore find the emerging Ukrainian interest in the Sahel troubling, not because Ukraine has no right to diplomacy in Africa, nor because Russia deserves an uncontested sphere of influence, but because Africa should refuse the role of strategic collateral. The Sahel has buried too many people beneath somebody else’s grand theory of power. We should not allow another foreign rivalry to arrive wearing the costume of liberation while carrying the luggage of war. The desert has endured empires, jihadists, colonisers, coups and mercenaries. It should not now be asked to endure proxy warfare as well. Africa’s tragedy has never been a shortage of foreign friends. It has been the frequency with which those friends discover that our wounds are useful to them.
Hashim Yussuf Amao is a geopolitical analyst from Ibadan, Nigeria
He can be reached via: hashimlegalbard@gmail.com

